Payment for environmental service contracts commonly require actions beyond adoption of a practice, such as undergoing specified enrollment procedures, granting consent to being monitored, and paying penalties for violations. These provisions are a bundle of attributes a landholder must accept with contract enrollment, leading to transaction costs in the contracting process. This article develops a principal-agent framework to study the links between these transaction costs and the well-known information asymmetries between the landholders and the government agency offering contracts. Using stated choice data collected from a sample of farmers, we estimate a mixed logit model to quantify the contribution of different contract attributes on contract willingness-to-accept (WTA). More stringent provisions in contracts were found to raise individual WTA by widely differing amounts across farmers, but the average effects imply that overall contract supply is sensitive to stringency. From a series of microsimulations based on the estimated model, we find that transaction costs create a significant drain on the cost-effectiveness of contracting from the agency's point of view, similar in magnitude to the inefficiency created by hidden information. While stringent contractual terms raise program expenditures, they may be justified if they raise compliance rates enough to offset the added cost. We also simulate an implicit frontier to trace out the change in compliance needed to justify a given increase in stringency. For environmental benefits in the range of previous estimates, this analysis suggests that stringent terms would need to substantially raise compliance rates to be cost effective.
Payment for environmental services (PES) contracts are a common means of acquiring ecosystem goods or services from private landholders. Such contracts are becoming more prevalent globally, with much of the growth coming from environmental markets in developing nations where PES contracts are a traded instrument (Blackman and Woodward 2010; Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010) . In the United States, PES contracts are used in a number of the major federal conservation programs in forestry and agriculture (Mercer, Cooley, and Hamilton 2011; Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008) , in which a government agency is the sole buyer. In these and many other PES settings, enrolled landholders receive a payment in exchange for a practice or change in land use instead of service provision per se, because of the difficulty in measuring environmental services at small scales.
A large literature has addressed the performance of PES schemes, which can be hindered by various factors (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008) . PES contracts are executed in a principalagent setting, where the buyer of contracts is the principal and the landholder selling a contract is an agent. Frictions due to information asymmetries arise because agents hold private information on their individual costs before contracts are signed (Chambers 1992; Ferraro 2008; Fraser 1995;  Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; Peterson and Boisvert 2004; Spulber 1988; Wu and Babcock 1996) and on their compliance during the contract period (Choe and Fraser 1999; Fraser 1995; Hart 2005; Ozanne 2001; Ozanne and White 2008) . Even with full compliance, practicebased contracts commonly assume spatially averaged or simulated service provision, which may not be realized on all contracted sites (Cattaneo 2003) . Moreover, some of the enrolled landholders may have adopted the practice in the absence of contracts, so that some contracts lack "additionality" (Mason and Plantinga 2013; Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010) . A recognized but sparsely studied friction is the transaction cost incurred by contracting parties, which adds social costs to the realized level of services.
Transaction costs in contracting occur in many forms, including the costs of formulating, negotiating, and executing contracts, as well as the costs of monitoring and measuring actions during the contract period (Cacho, Marshall, and Milne 2005) . While very few studies address PES contracts specifically, there exists an empirical literature on various types of transaction costs borne by government agencies and farmers in environmental programs (e.g., Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001a; McCann and Easter 1999; McCann 2009; Vernimmen 2000) . This paper focuses on the transaction costs borne by agents in the PES contracting process and the associated impacts on aggregate outcomes. Previous studies have simulated the aggregate effects of transaction costs in PES schemes (e.g., Antle et al. 2007; Netusil and Braden 2001) but because of the paucity of empirical estimates, they usually model transaction costs as a constant price premium across all contracts sold. In this paper, we develop estimates of transaction costs that vary across agents, which allows for a varying premium.
Our estimates are based on a principal-agent framework, which captures the potential links between transaction costs and information asymmetries. To mitigate against noncompliance or "moral hazard," many PES contracts include provisions beyond a commitment to adopt a practice.
Agents often face a detailed enrollment process before signing a contract, and by signing usually grant their consent to being monitored with penalties assessed for violations (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008) . We model these provisions as a bundle of attributes an agent must accept with contract enrollment. More stringent provisions (e.g., increased inspection frequency) raise the likelihood of contract compliance but at the same time reduce the agent's utility of enrolling. To maintain the enrollment of the marginal agent, the principal must add a premium to payments to cover the transaction costs of the extra stringency. At an aggregate scale, contract stringency determines both the location and shape the contract supply curve. Heterogeneity across agents implies an upward sloping supply curve and contract stringency shifts the supply toward higher prices, although not necessarily in parallel fashion.
Our model also captures the second information asymmetry between the principal and agents.
If agents hold private information on their reservation prices of contracting, the principal can only offer a uniform contract payment, which implies that at least some agents receive a payment exceeding their willingness-to-accept (WTA). These excess payments are known as information rents, which have been estimated to be a substantial share of payments in many existing programs (Ferraro 2008) .
To fix ideas, we assume that the principal faces an exogenous enrollment target, and that the program objective is to maximize the net gains from the contracted acreage. Net gains are defined as environmental benefits, which depend on contract stringency through compliance effects, less payment expenditures, which are determined from the contract supply. The principal's problem is analyzed in two steps, where aggregate payment expenditures are derived as a function of contract stringency first, and then stringency is chosen by trading off environmental benefits against aggregate payments. A key result from the first step is that contract stringency generally affects both transaction costs and information rents. This implies that the principal can reduce aggregate expenditures by varying stringency, as an alternative to price discriminating on the basis of individual WTA. In the second step, we derive the implicit optimal frontier between stringency and contract compliance, which traces out the minimum change in compliance needed to justify an increase in stringency.
We apply our model to empirically assess the role of transaction costs in a hypothetical water quality trading market in Kansas. Our analysis is related to a recent literature that has analyzed contract enrollment decisions with stated choice data (Christensen et al. 2011; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Horne 2006; Hudson and Lusk 2004; Ma et al. 2012; Ruto and Garrod 2009; Vedel, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2010) . Similar to these works, we employ data from discrete choice experiments with landowners, where contract alternatives included price and nonprice attributes, and we analyze the resulting data with a mixed logit model. We depart from the existing literature, however, by estimating the full set of correlations among the coefficients in agents' utility functions. The estimated correlations are needed to capture the potential nonlinearities of shifts in contract supply.
We then conduct a series of microsimulations of the estimated model to assess aggregate impacts. With our sample of farmers, we find that transaction costs account for a substantial portion of total payments, comparable in magnitude to information rents. We also find that the principal could significantly reduce information rents (as well as transaction costs) by relaxing contract stringency. In our setting, the simulated compliance frontier suggests that for plausible values of environmental benefits, very large increases in compliance are necessary to justify even moderate contract stringency levels.
Conceptual Model
Consider a principal who must set both the terms and prices of PES contracts to be offered to a large number of heterogeneous agents. A contract is specified by (p, x), where p is the contract payment for enrolling a fixed amount of land and x = (x 1 , . . . , x K ) is a set of nonprice attributes including eligibility requirements, noncompliance penalties, monitoring procedures, and other provisions.
Agents may be heterogeneous both with respect to their costs of committing to a contract and with respect to the environmental benefits from adopting the practice it requires (Ferraro 2003; Yang, Khanna, and Farnsworth 2005) . In general, the principal may have and exploit agent-level information on both costs and benefits in the contracting process. However, we consider a pure practice-based program, in which payments are in exchange for practice adoption and do not depend on individual levels of environmental services. This accords with many PES schemes, which commonly do not attempt to measure the actual benefits provided by each agent (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008) . Regarding costs, we consider alternative cases where the principal does and does not exploit agent-level information.
Agents' Choices
We first consider the agents' decisions. Each agent n = 1, . . . , N makes a voluntary choice to enroll in at most one contract and, conditional on enrollment, decides whether to comply with its terms. Enrolling in a contract (p, x) will yield an expected utility of
where α n is the agent's marginal utility of income, c n (x) is the expected disutility of complying with the contract, and v n (x) is the expected disutility of violating the contract. c n (·) accounts for the costs of adopting the practice required by the contract as well as the disutility of complying with the terms in x. v n (·) accounts for the psychic and reputation costs of violation as well as the expected monetary expenses such as noncompliance penalties. Equation (1) implies that agent n will comply as long as v n (x) ≥ c n (x). We define the nonprice attributes as stringency-increasing, where greater stringency implies a higher cost of violating but also a higher cost of complying (i.e., ∂c n /∂x k ≥ 0 and ∂v n /∂x k ≥ 0 for all k).
To characterize the enrollment decision, the reservation utility of non-enrollment is normalized to u 0 = 0 for all n. The optimized utility of enrolling from equation (1) can be expressed as
, where φ n (x) ≡ min{c n (x), v n (x)} is the cost of the agent's optimal compliance/violation choice given the terms x. Enrollment will then be optimal if α n p−φ n (x) ≥ 0, implying a decision rule that we express as
where y n = 1 and y n = 0 indicate enrollment and non-enrollment, respectively. The term
is defined as agent n's willingness-to-accept or minimum acceptable payment.
Heterogeneity in preferences across agents leads to a distribution of WTA, which in turn implies that the fraction of agents who enroll varies with contract payments and terms. The relationship between aggregate enrollment and varying combinations of (p, x) can be regarded as a contract supply function. The properties of contract supply can be usefully analyzed with order statistics. 1 Let w(q, x) denote the q th order statistic of the distribution {WTA n (x)} N n=1 . For a given set of attributes, x, the vector [w(1, x), . . . , w(N, x)] is the set of all agents' WTA values sorted in ascending order. We assume that each agent has a distinct WTA, so that the sorted values increase in a strictly monotone way for all x; i.e., w(1, x) < w(2, x) < · · · < w(N, x).
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The locus of points {(q, w(q, x))} then traces out the contract supply relationship. For simplicity, we assume that each contract enrolls a fixed amount of land (e.g., 100 acres) so the contract acreage supply is proportional to the contract supply. Note that the supply of environmental services depends on the pattern of heterogeneity in environmental benefits from the practice and compliance with the contract; we return to this issue below. Figure 1 depicts two contract supply relationships in the special case where WTA is uniformly distributed across a large number of agents, so that supply is closely approximated by a linear function. The two supply functions in the figure correspond to two different contractual terms that differ in stringency, x 0 x 1 .
The relative locations of the two supply functions illustrates a general property of order statistics: if WTA n (x 1 ) > WTA n (x 0 ) for all n, then w(q, x 1 ) > w(q, x 0 ) for all q. Intuitively, this property means that increasing contractual stringency causes the supply relationship to shift toward higher prices. The size of the shift represents the transaction costs borne by agents, in the sense that increasing stringency from x 0 to x 1 requires a premium of τ ≡ w(q, x 1 ) − w(q, x 0 ) to be added to the payment in order to maintain the enrollment of q agents. Figure 1 depicts a case where this premium is positively correlated with initial WTA; i.e., τ grows as w(q; 0) increases along the supply locus. In this case w(q, x 1 ) has a steeper slope than w(q; x 0 ). If this premium is negatively correlated with initial WTA, then w(q, x 1 ) is flatter than w(q; x 0 ). The nature of such correlations and their effects on the shape of contract supply are empirical questions that we address in our application below. The structure of the problem depends on the level of the principal's information on agents'
Principal's Choice of Payments
individual WTA. We consider the polar cases of full information on individual agents and zero (aggregate only) information. In case of full information, the principal can perfectly price discriminate and offer a distinct price to each agent, leading to the problem
where p n is the payment offered to agent n. In the case of zero information, the problem is (3) with the additional constraint of a uniform price, i.e., p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p N . By letting p denote the common price charged to all agents, the problem simplifies to
We denote the solutions to problem (3) by p n (x) (n = 1, . . . , N ) and the solution to (4) by p(x).
We also let e info (x) and e noinfo (x) denote the optimized value of the objective function, or minimum payment expenditures, in the cases of full and zero information, respectively.
In the case of full information, the principal will optimally enroll the set of agents with the lowest WTA to meet the enrollment target. These agents are precisely the group with a WTA at or below the Q th lowest value in the population, or those meeting the condition WTA n ≤ w(Q, x).
The principal will optimally offer a price to each such agent following the rule of first-degree price discrimination. That is, the solution to problem (3) is
For the remaining high-cost agents (those with WTA n > w(Q, x)), the principal may offer any price strictly below WTA to dissuade them from enrolling. For the example in figure 1 when contractual terms are x = x 0 , enrolled agents receive the varying prices along the curve w(q, x 0 )
to the left of the target Q. Total expenditures are then the accumulated area under w(q, x) up to Q,
which is area D in figure 1 when contract terms are x 0 and area B + C + D when they are x 1 .
In the case of zero information, the optimal solution is a uniform price of p(x) = w(Q, x) to all agents, implying optimized expenditures of
For contractual terms of x 0 , the smallest uniform payment that will enroll Q agents is the value along the supply curve, w(Q, x 0 ), and the principal's total expenditures are the area C +D. For the more stringent terms x 1 , the uniform payment would need to be increased to w(Q, x 1 ), yielding total expenditures of A + B + C + D.
We can now define two measures that quantify the response of expenditures to changes in information and to contract stringency. First, information rents are defined as
or the reduction in expenditures between the polar cases of zero and full information. Because information rents arise from a given supply curve, they are a function of the stringency of contracts,
x. For the case of x = x 0 in figure 1, going from zero to full information reduces expenditures by r(x 0 ) = C. Information rents with the more stringent contracts are r(x 1 ) = A.
A second measure quantifies the stringency-induced transaction costs from the principal's point of view, holding the level of information fixed. Let
denote the increase in payment expenditures resulting from a change in contract terms from x 0 to x 1 , where i ∈ {info, noinfo} denotes the level of information. In what follows we refer to this measure as the "additional transaction costs" due to a change in stringency. In the noinformation case in figure 1, raising contract stringency from x 0 to x 1 raises payment expenditures
In the full information case, additional transaction costs are
The relationships in figure 1 suggest that correlation patterns between the transaction cost premium (τ ) and the supply curve create a dependency of information rents on contract stringency.
For the case of linear relationships and positive correlation depicted in the figure, an increase in stringency from x 0 to x 1 not only generates additional transaction costs, but also changes information rents from r(x 0 ) = C to r(x 1 ) = A. As noted above, the positive correlation causes the supply relationship for x 1 to be more steeply sloped than that for x 0 , which implies that A > C. For nonlinear supply relationships, the interaction effects must be resolved empirically. We explicitly account for this correlation in our analysis below.
The dependence of information rents on stringency has important policy implications. Previous literature has shown that information rents can be large, but often schemes to price discriminate are practically difficult to implement and politically unappealing. If information rents can be reduced instead by relaxing stringency, the principal has a more politically feasible alternative that also has the benefit of lowering transaction costs. Of course, one concern with less stringent contracts is that compliance may decrease. This tradeoff is formalized in the principal's first-stage problem.
Principal's Choice of Stringency
In the first stage, the principal sets contract stringency, x, accounting for the changes in payment expenditures as well as the changes in environmental benefits due to compliance effects. Let b q (q = 1, . . . , Q) denote the potential environmental benefits obtained from the contracted practice for the agent in the q th position on the contract supply curve and let λ q (x) denote the expected share of benefits actually obtained given the agent's compliance effort. 4 Total expected environmental benefits among the Q agents enrolled is then
properties of B(x) depends on the joint distribution of b q and λ q (x). In particular, the definition of covariance implies that expected benefits can be written
are the means of benefits and compliance, respectively, for those agents that enroll in a contract and σ is the covariance between benefits and compliance.
Compared to the case where b and compliance are uncorrelated (σ = 0), equation (10) reveals that a positive correlation implies higher expected benefits. This occurs because correlation causes the farmers with the highest potential environmental benefits to have the largest fraction of their benefits captured. 5 We assume here that the covariance between benefits and compliance is fixed and does not depend on contract stringency. In the supplementary appendix, we show that results from the conceptual and empirical models differ little if the covariance is endogenous.
Another relevant correlation is that between potential benefits and agents' WTA along the contract supply curve. This correlation affects the mean of potential benefits among the sub-population of agents enrolling in contracts,b. As the sub-population of agents enrolling are those with the lowest WTA (figure 1), a positive (negative) correlation between WTA and potential benefits implies that the mean benefits among enrollees will be relatively low (high) compared to the overall mean.
Thus, the B(x) function will shift downward if the correlation between WTA and b rises.
Using (10), the principal's first-stage problem with an information level of i can be written
where a(x) is the principal's administrative cost of executing and enforcing a contract with a stringency of x. The principal's objective is to maximize environmental benefits, net of of administrative costs and payment expenditures. In practice, there is considerable uncertainty around the solution to this problem because little is known about the component functions. 6 However, information on the expenditure function, which is the empirical focus in this article, can be exploited to trace out the efficient frontier between stringency and mean compliance. In particular, changing stringency from x 0 to x 1 would increase the value of the objective function in (11) if
which reduces to
where ∆λ =λ(x 1 ) −λ(x 0 ) and ∆a = a(x 1 ) − a(x 0 ). The expression on the right side of (12) is a bound on the increase in mean compliance that a change in stringency must achieve. This bound is the ratio of the costs of the stringency change, t i (·)/Q + ∆a, to mean environmental benefits,b.
The bound is a declining and convex curve when plotted against environmental benefits.
For some intuition, consider a simple example where an increase in stringency would create additional transaction costs per enrollee of t i (·)/Q =$30. Initially suppose also that ∆a = 0; i.e., contract stringency has no effect on administrative costs. For environmental benefits ofb =$100, the added stringency would need to satisfy ∆λ > 0.3. As transaction costs represent 30% of potential benefits, an extra 3 out of every 10 farmers need to comply to capture enough new benefits to offset the new costs. If stringency does affect a, the condition becomes ∆λ ≥ 0.3 + ∆a/b. In the empirical analysis below, we generate points along the frontier in (12) from our estimates of the t i (·) relations and other parameter values from the literature.
Data
Our data are from choice experiments representing contracting alternatives in a hypothetical water quality market. Our experiments were framed as a proposed market where municipal wastewater treatment plants could offset their discharges by buying PES contracts from farmers. Each plant could offer contractual payments and rules to suit its individual needs, generating a variety of contract offerings for farmers to consider.
Experimental Design
The attributes of the hypothetical contracts and the levels across which they were varied are in indicates Rotational No-till, where tillage is allowed for up to half of the contracted years. These practices were selected because they are relatively common and are easily understood by farmers, and are also known to be effective at increasing water quality.
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The remaining attributes are contractual terms. AppTime is the time requirement at contract initiation to go through the enrollment process; it was varied from 4 to 40 hours to reflect a wide range of enrollment complexity. InspectPr indicates the share of contract enrollees inspected for compliance each year, which was either 10% or 100%. Penalty is a one-time fine to be paid if the farmer is found in violation of a contract, and was varied from $50/acre to $500/acre. Finally, the Payment attribute was varied from $3/acre/year to $25/acre/year, based on the ranges used by Cooper and Keim (1996) and Cooper (1997) .
Subjects in the experiments were given booklets with a series of choice tasks, each task having three contract alternatives. For visual consistency and to reduce the number of attributes in our experimental design, the first alternative in every choice task was a contract requiring installation of a filter strip, the second was a contract requiring no-till, and the third alternative was a do-notenroll option. To facilitate comparison, subjects were told that all contracts had a 10-year duration and that the field being considered for enrollment was 100 acres in size. In addition, they were asked to assume that (i) the land quality of the field was representative of their farm, (ii) the most recent tillage practice was minimum tillage (not no-till or conventional tillage), and (iii) the recent cropping pattern followed their typical crop rotation.
Prior to data collection, the attribute levels and data collection procedures were refined from meetings with cooperative Extension staff and a focus group with farmers. To construct the choice scenarios, we generated an orthogonal main effects design that varied all five attributes across the two contract alternatives (Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams 1994) . The smallest such design contained 32 scenarios, which were blocked into two sets of 16, giving us two versions of the experiment that were randomly assigned across subjects.
Sample Characteristics
Data were gathered from groups of farmers attending Extension meetings at four locations in Kansas. Subjects were recruited at each meeting via a pre-registration mailing and an announcement at the opening conference session. The choice experiment itself was then conducted during a 1-hour session, typically scheduled with the help of the meeting organizers as a parallel session in a one-day program. Data were collected from 135 subjects across the four locations, providing a total of 2,177 usable choice observations. 8 Additional details on data collection are in the supplementary appendix. The nature of our sample then, may have implications for the extent to which results are generalizable to a broader population. The transaction cost measurement literature suggests that our sample will produce an under-estimate of the transaction costs incurred by the average farmer.
Education reduces information processing costs (Huffman 1974 
Econometric Analysis
Our econometric analysis is built on a random utility framework. Let C s denote the set of alternatives in choice scenario s = 1, . . . , 16. In our empirical specification of equation (1), subject n's utility from choosing contract alternative j ∈ C s in choice scenario s is U nj = V nj + j , where V nj is the nonrandom portion of utility that can be modeled as a function of observed factors and j is a random term representing unobserved factors. The modeled portion of utility is specified as
where z j = (FSnohay j , FShay j , NTcont j , NTrot j ) indicates the contracted practice, x j = (AppTime j , Epen j , Annual j ) is a vector of nonprice attributes, and θ n ≡ (α n , γ n , β n ) are the utility coefficients to be estimated. The first element of x j (AppTime) is taken directly from the choice experiments (table 1) , while the remaining two are derived attributes. The second element is the interaction between inspection frequency and the penalty: Epen = InspectPr × Penalty, or the expected penalty to be paid conditional on violating the contract. The third element, Annual, is a binary variable capturing the independent effect of increased inspections, where Annual = 1 if InspectPr = 1 ("annual monitoring") and Annual = 0 otherwise. These derived attributes allow us to separate two conceptually distinct effects of inspection probability on enrollment. To identify the parameters of the model we impose the normalization restriction that V nj = 0 for the do-not-enroll alternative.
In sum, our empirical specification of utility captures the disutility of enrollment (φ n (·) in the conceptual section) through the terms γ n z j + β n x j . The elements of γ are practice-specific constants, while the elements of β represent the marginal utility of contract attributes.
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Derived Estimates
Given estimates of the utility coefficients,θ n , we can derive estimates of several other variables of interest. First, a point estimate of agent n's WTA for a particular contract is
The change in WTA in response to a change in the k th attribute in x, or the marginal willingnessto-accept (MWTA) of x k , can be estimated as
MWTA measures the separate effect of each contract attribute on enrollment costs. The MWTA for each of the binary elements of z is −γ nl /α n , which can be interpreted as agent n's expected cost of committing to the l th practice.
Under particular assumptions, the MWTA for expected penalties has a further interpretation as an indicator of an agent's compliance intentions. Let λ n denote agent n's subjective probability of complying with a contract if he/she were to enroll, which is assumed to differ across individuals but to remain constant across practices (z) and contractual terms (x) for each individual. A $1 increase in Epen then imposes a cost of $1 on an agent in the state of the world where the agent violates the contract (occurring with probability 1 − λ n ), and has a cost of zero otherwise, for an expected cost of $(1 − λ n ). If agent n is risk neutral, then MWTA n,Epen = 1 − λ n or n's subjective probability of violating contracts. If the agent is risk averse, then MWTA n,Epen is an upper-bound estimate of the subjective violation probability. A complete derivation of these results is in the supplementary appendix.
It should be noted, however, that the assumption of fixed individual compliance rates is restrictive because it holds a farmer's compliance probability constant across across practices and across different stringency levels. Compliance may differ across practices because tillage and the width of a filter strip would be easy to monitor, but grazing a filter strip may be difficult to detect in a late-season inspection. Further, the probability of complying may rise if penalties or the inspection frequency increase. Given the structure of our data, we cannot identify the parameters of a function λ n (z, x), separately from the utility coefficients, β. Although our derived estimate of λ n cannot capture within-subject variation in compliance, it does capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity in farmers' ex ante uncertainty about their ability to comply, such as prior experience with the practice or uncertainty regarding future constraints on production (Vedel, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2010).
Mixed Logit Specification
The utility coefficients were estimated with a mixed logit (MXL) model (Train 1998 (Train , 2003 . The MXL model is one of the most general approaches to capture preference heterogeneity, in which coefficients are allowed to vary across subjects following a specified distribution. A limitation of the MXL model is that the researcher must specify a form for the coefficient distribution based on little guidance from theory. Here, our base specification is the multivariate normal distribution, i.e., θ ∼ M V N (µ, Σ) where µ is the mean vector of the coefficients and Σ is the covariance matrix.
We specify the most general form of this distribution allowing for all pairwise correlations among the coefficients. While these correlations complicate estimation, they are relevant here because they may affect the shape of contract supply.
Although a common choice in applications of the MXL model, the normal distribution imposes a symmetric shape on the coefficient distribution and has unbounded support. These assumptions may not be valid for all coefficients. For example, the marginal utility of income (α n ) is expected to be bounded above zero for all agents. In addition, we might expect this (and other) coefficient distributions to be skewed if there are clusters of values near zero and a number of outliers spread over a long tail on one side of zero. As a robustness check, we also estimated the model where the coefficients with a theoretically expected sign were distributed lognormally while those with unrestricted signs were distributed normally (see the supplementary appendix). The distributional assumptions make little difference to our main conclusions, so we only present results here for the model with all coefficients normally distributed.
Estimation procedures for the MXL model are described by Train (2003) and Greene (2007) .
The model derives its name from the 'mixing' of the coefficient distribution in estimation with the utility error, j , which is assumed to follow an extreme-value type I distribution. The likelihood that a subject's utility is maximized under their observed choices then has a known form but must be integrated over the mixing distribution using simulation or other methods (Train 2003, p. 148-151) . We employed the maximum simulated likelihood method with NLOGIT 4.0 Greene (2007), with 150 draws taken from the coefficient distribution in each iteration. Coefficients are specified to vary across individuals but are fixed for a given individual across all choice scenarios.
Estimation Results
The estimated means and dispersions (standard deviations) of the utility coefficients from the base model are reported in table 3. Nearly all of these parameters were estimated with high statistical significance, evidence that the coefficient distributions are centered away from zero and also vary across individuals. The magnitudes of the estimates are difficult to interpret directly as they are measured in utility units. To aid in interpretation, the last column of the table reports the implied marginal WTA of each variable at the estimated means of the coefficients. The next section presents a more comprehensive analysis of the implied WTA distributions.
The estimated coefficient means have signs consistent with theory and previous studies. The mean subject is estimated to incur disutility from committing to a practice (γ 0). The MWTA associated with the practice dummies represents the average farmer's perceived commitment costs, which range from $1.45/acre to $9.43/acre across the four practices. The estimated cost of committing to less restrictive versions of the practices are smaller; filter strips are less costly when haying and grazing is allowed, and no-till is less costly when it can be adopted on a rotational basis. Consistent with previous findings (Broch and Vedel 2010; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010) , these differences indicate that greater flexibility reduces agents' opportunity costs of committing to a practice.
The estimated mean of the coefficient on AppTime implies that the average farmer would need about $0.20/acre in additional annual income to be compensated for an extra hour of application time at contract inception. Given that a contract would enroll a 100-acre field and the payments would be received annually over a 10-year period, this estimate translates to an hourly compensation of about $150/hour assuming the farmer discounts the income stream at a rate of 0.05. This value seems large, but may partly reflect landowners' expectation of reporting requirements during the contract period if the enrollment process is complex, along with a strong aversion to paperwork.
The estimated mean coefficient for Epen implies a MWTA of about $0.015/acre per dollar of expected penalties. As discussed above, under particular assumptions this result means that the average landowner places at most a 1.5% probability on violating contractual terms. This estimate is somewhat lower than the observed noncompliance rates in existing programs. Both citing USDA datasets, Cattaneo (2003) reported that 11% of the contracted practices in the EQIP program during the period 1997-2000 were not fulfilled, while Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) reported that 4% of audited farmers receiving commodity payments in 1997 did not fulfill conservation compliance requirements. However, our estimate represents a farmer's subjective probability formed prior to enrollment, which may be influenced by psychological factors such as overconfidence in one's future performance or the desire to punish violators. Overconfidence has been found to be more prevalent among males (Estes and Hosseini 1988; Bhandari and Deaves 2006) , who comprise the vast majority of our sample.
Finally, the negative MWTA of Annual implies that, holding all other attributes constant including expected penalties, the average subject prefers annual monitoring over a 10% spot check system. However, this interpretation assumes that all other regressors are constant, which implies that a change from a spot-check to an annual monitoring system would be accompanied by a 10-fold decrease in the Penalty variable to keep Epen unchanged. If instead Penalty is held constant, then the MWTA of Annual at mean coefficients is −(β 3 + 0.9 ×β 2 × Penalty)/α. 10 This value is negative when Penalty is less than $204 but becomes positive for larger penalties, reaching a value of $4.08 at Penalty = 500, the maximum of that attribute in the choice experiments. These results are consistent with recent research suggesting that agents perceive both benefits and costs from monitoring of their actions, so that net benefits may differ in sign across different situations.
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While the means of the distributions generally conform with expectations, most of the coefficients have relatively large estimated dispersions, implying that a non-trivial share of individuals are estimated to have coefficients with the opposing sign as the mean. The implied percentage of subjects with negative coefficients are reported in the second-to-last column of table 3. As discussed above, these patterns may arise partly from the unbounded support of the normal distribution. Another potential data problem is that preferences of a given subject may not remain stable as they complete a sequence of 16 choice tasks due to learning and/or fatigue effects (Savage and Waldman 2008) . We ran alternative models that address both these issues, and found that our main findings were robust across models (see supplementary appendix).
The estimated correlation coefficients in table 4 reveal a number of important patterns. 12 The practice specific constants are positively correlated with each other, indicating that farmers who can adopt one practice at low cost can also adopt other practices at low cost. The coefficient on Epen (β 2 ) is positively correlated with all the practice constants, which, consistent with intuition, suggests that farmers who have a low subjective probability of violating a contract are also low-cost adopters. Also consistent with intuition, the correlation between the coefficients of Payment (α) and AppTime (β 1 ) is negative and significant, indicating that farmers with a high marginal utility of income also have a high disutility of enrollment time.
Contract Simulations
We conducted a series of microsimulations to quantify the market-level effects implied by our econometric estimates. Our simulations are numerical implementations of our conceptual model, yielding predicted points on the surface of the expenditure function e i (x), from which we can generate estimates of information rents and additional transaction costs. The statistical uncertainty around each point is quantified with Monte Carlo methods.
Each simulation predicts outcomes for contracts requiring a single practice. We ran two simulations, one for Continuous No-till contracts and the other for Filter Strip (no haying/grazing) contracts. These simulations are sufficient to capture the differences across practice types, as the two additional practices in our choice experiments are more flexible (and hence lower cost) versions of the simulated ones.
Costs and Contract Payments
We first simulated the outcomes in the second stage of the principal's problem, in which contract payments are set given contract supply relations, a fixed enrollment target, and a specified level of contract stringency. The inputs for each simulation include the following elements:
• The estimation results from the MXL model. These include the estimated coefficient means, µ, and covariance matrix,Σ, that reflect the pattern of preference heterogeneity across agents. In addition, to simulate the confidence intervals around the final outputs, the model requires estimates of the sampling variance around these point estimates. Lettingδ = vec(μ,Σ) denote the full set of (vectorized) parameters estimated, the simulations also use the matrix V =v ar(δ), the maximum likelihood estimate of the sampling covariances surrounding the estimated parameters.
• The enrollment target, Q. The simulation model inputs this target as the proportionȳ ∈ [0, 1] of agents to be enrolled (i.e., Q =ȳN ). We specified a target ofȳ = 0.5, which implies that the last agent enrolled has median preferences.
• The stringency level(s) of the contract. To be able to trace out a frontier for the first stage decision, we simulated four stringency levels represented by the attribute profiles, x, in table 5. The first profile represents a base case where all attributes are set at the minimum values in the choice experiments, while the remaining profiles are intended to represent "low,"
"medium," and "high" stringency levels based on the range of estimates from the literature.
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The simulation follows a nested Monte-Carlo method based on Hu, Veeman, and Adamowicz (2005) . An 'inner' algorithm captures the variation in agent's costs and enrollment actions due to preference heterogeneity, while an 'outer' loop quantifies the statistical uncertainty in the inner simulation results. 14 In the inner loop, a sequence of independent draws, θ 1 , . . . ,θ N , is taken from a M V N (μ,Σ) distribution, where each drawθ n represents the utility coefficients of an agent. For each agent, WTA n is calculated for each of the four x profiles using equation (14).
The WTA n 's are then sorted in ascending order for each x, generating the family of supply relationships in panels (a) and (b) of figure 2. For each supply curve, expenditures under full and zero information are calculated from equations (6) and (7), yielding the results in panels (c) and (d).
Finally, information rents and additional transaction costs are calculated from (8) and (9), shown in panels (e) and (f). The simulation results are the empirical equivalents of the theoretical areas in figure 1 , where areas are calculated as numerical integrals.
The 'outer' loop runs m = 1, . . . , M iterations of the inner algorithm, each time perturbing the M V N (μ,Σ) coefficient distribution with an error drawn from V. In effect, payments are simulated for M agent populations, each of which has a slightly different distribution of preferences over its N members. We set M = N = 10, 000 in both simulations. The bar heights in the middle and bottom panels of figure 2 are the means of the output across the M perturbations, while the error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Panels (a) and (b) of figure 2 reveal that contract stringency has both first-order and secondorder effects on contract supply. The first order effect is that more stringent contracts shift the supply relationship toward higher prices, as expected. Although the attributes of more stringent contracts are not costly for all agents (table 3) , the bulk of agents face higher costs, resulting in an upward shift. The second order effect is a reduction in supply elasticity -i.e., the supply curves become more steeply sloped as contracts become more stringent.
The results in panels (c)-(f) of figure 2 decompose the payments needed to enroll half of the agents in the respective practice. As explained in the conceptual section, information rents are the difference between simulated expenditures at zero and full information, while additional transaction costs are the difference between expenditures at a given stringency and those at Minimum stringency. At each stringency level, the heights of the two bars in panels (e) and (f) represent the potential reduction in payment expenditures from either (i) eliminating information rents by using individual WTA information to price discriminate or (ii) reducing additional transaction costs by reducing contract stringency to the Minimum level. The additional transaction costs assume zero information, which we take to be the policy-relevant baseline.
Consistent with previous findings, simulated information rents were large in proportion to total payments in each scenario, ranging from 64% and 78% of zero-information payments. Thus, a potentially large fraction of payment expenditures could be avoided through the collection and use of information. We find here that additional transaction costs are of a comparably large magnitude, although they naturally depend on the assumed level of stringency. At Low stringency, additional transaction costs represent 18% and 32% of zero-information payments for the No-till and Filter
Strip contracts, respectively, while at High stringency they account for 52% and 69% of initial payments for those contracts.
From a baseline of highly stringent contracts and zero information, the principal has a similar scope to reduce payments through changes in contract design as through collecting information.
Moreover, relaxing contract stringency reduces information rents as well as transaction costs. For example, by relaxing stringency of Filter Strip contracts from High to Low, information rents decline from $8.72 to $4.55 per enrolled acre (while at the same time transaction costs decline from $9.36 to $1.94 per enrolled acre). This interaction does not hold in general, but arises in our setting because of the estimated second-order effects of stringency as described above.
Compliance Frontiers
Even if stringent contracts result in larger payments, the principal may still prefer greater stringency if it raises environmental benefits through greater compliance. To quantify this effect, we simulated the results of the principal's first-stage problem, finding points along the frontier in equation (12).
The value of t i (x 0 , x 1 )/Q in (12) we were unable to find quantitative estimates of the change in costs from the type of contract stringency changes modeled here. We set ∆a = 0 in our simulations, which generates frontiers with the lowest possible change in compliance needed for a given stringency change. The resulting frontiers, in figure 3, should thus be interpreted as lower bounds. values above $30/acre. As described in the conceptual section, these frontiers also assume that the covariance between environmental benefits and compliance is fixed and does not depend on stringency. In the supplementary appendix, we develop a simulation framework where covariance is endogenous but find that our main results change little.
The frontiers reveal that highly stringent contracts must be very effective at raising compliance to be justified, particularly when mean benefits are low. 
Conclusions
This article has identified the role of transaction costs in PES contracts that arise from stringency in nonprice contractual terms. Transaction costs may coexist with information rents, which arise from landowners' private information on their own costs of committing to a contract. In our empirical analysis, we find that additional transaction costs from increased contract stringency are of comparable magnitude to information rents. We do not, however, estimate the cost of actually collecting the WTA information in order to price discriminate, which would partly offset the payment savings represented by information rents. The substantive role of stringency-induced transaction costs suggests that careful attention to contractual provisions is warranted in the design of PES programs and markets. Transaction costs may partly explain the low participation rates observed in many environmental markets.
While much literature has devised methods, such as auctions or mechanism design, to reduce payments by inducing agents to voluntarily reveal WTA information, our findings suggest that relaxing contractual stringency is an alternative payment-reducing strategy. For the case studied here, less stringent contracts not only reduce transaction costs but also substantially reduce information rents. This interaction may not hold in general but is linked to the positive correlations between agents' costs of committing to practices and their costs of dealing with stringent contractual terms.
Of course, a primary disadvantage of relaxing stringency is that environmental benefits may be sacrificed if contract compliance rates fall. We show how the estimates of stringency-induced transaction costs can illuminate the tradeoff between reduced payments and reduced environmental benefits from lost compliance. For the case studied here, highly stringent contractual provisions would be preferred only if those provisions have strong effects on compliance or if the benefits of practices are very high.
A limitation of our empirical analysis is that our choice data are based on hypothetical responses from a non-random sample of farmers, which may limit the generalizability of our findings. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the transaction costs incurred by representative farmers would be even larger than our estimates. First, to the extent that our subjects are not representative of the population, the transaction cost measurement literature suggests that costs of stringent contractual terms in our sample would be below average. Moreover, if our subjects exhibited social desirability bias in favor of enrolling, or were over-confident in their ability to benefit from hypothetical contracts, our estimated costs would lie below their actual costs.
Our focus here is on practice-based contracting, where the principal seeks to maximize expected environmental benefits, net of administrative and payments costs, from practices adopted on a fixed acreage. The contribution of such programs to social welfare depends on the correlation between benefits and WTA (Yang, Khanna, and Farnsworth 2005; Ferraro 2003) . In particular, a positive correlation may imply that the low-WTA agents with the greatest incentive to enroll also provide the lowest benefits, thus reducing the welfare gain. As our framework already accounts for the benefit-WTA correlation, a natural extension would be to model a performance-based program where contracts are denominated in environmental services provided. Empirical analysis of such a setting, however, would require site-specific data on environmental benefits of practice adoption.
Our analysis suggests ways that contracts should be designed to be maximally effective. Contractual terms should be designed to balance the objectives of keeping transaction costs and administrative costs low while raising the incentives to comply. Perhaps because of the potentially high costs of appeals and litigation, USDA has a relatively low frequency of inspecting and auditing contracts, and has often declined to extract penalties when noncompliance is discovered (Cattaneo 2003; Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008) . Instead, they have focused on an enrollment process that clearly documents the feasibility of a practice. While these procedures may improve compliance rates, our results suggest that they also may raise transaction costs, as farmers are found to be very averse to enrollment time but would be less averse to frequent inspection or moderate penalties. Our framework can be applied to quantify transaction costs and the most effective contract designs using new data on different contracting schemes.
Notes
1 Let the set S denote a sample containing N values. The q th order statistic in this sample, s(q), is the q th -lowest value in the set S, such that s(1) ≤ s(2) ≤ · · · ≤ s(N ).
2 This assumption does not have meaningful impacts on our results, but rules out the possibility of flat spots along the supply relationship that would lead to indeterminacies in the quantity of contracts supplied.
3 As one example, the Conservation Reserve Program has a statutory cap on enrolled acreage.
4 If compliance is binary, then λ q (x) represents the probability that the agent complies with the contractual requirements. More generally it captures the degree or rigor of compliance (e.g., the attention paid to seeding and maintenance of a filter strip), such that greater rigor captures a greater share of potential benefits. 6 This problem is not identical to maximizing restricted social welfare (where the restriction reflects enrollment of Q agents), but its components can be interpreted in welfare terms. In particular, if known, the first term in (11) accurately captures social benefits, but in the case of zero information the second term over-estimates social costs because the portion of payments reflecting information rents is simply a transfer from the principal to agents. If full information is the starting point, however, the objective in (11) is equivalent to restricted welfare. In sum, the results from (11) misrepresent welfare under zero information, but the maximum error is represented by information rents.
7 Filter strips have varying configurations and sizes. To maintain consistency in the experiment, we specified the filter strip as comprising 4 acres of the 100 acre field. Further, to make filter strips comparable to no-till, which may be implemented at zero or negative costs for many farmers, subjects were told to assume that they would be fully compensated for all installation, maintenance, and land rent costs on those 4 acres. The payment would then be compensation for the transaction costs of the contract plus the cost of managing the filter strip (avoiding use as a roadway, repairing and reseeding any eroded areas), and again for consistency with the no-till contract, the payment would be received on a per acre basis for all 100 acres. ) denote statistical significance at the 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
